Epictetus: Discourses 1.3 Relationship to God and its Consequences
In Discourses 1.3 Epictetus states that we are children of God.
If one could fully and properly assimilate the idea that we’re all principally children of God—that God is the father of both human beings and gods—I doubt he’d ever think of himself as base or despicable.
-Discourses 1.3.1 (Waterfield)[1]
This sounds a little jarring at first, what does it mean for a Stoic to say they are the children of God? Epictetus is using very specific rhetoric in this entire discourse, that isn’t to say he doesn’t consider us children of God, but he is simplifying concepts to really drive home a distinction he wants to make here between the body and reason. It is through our reason that we are children of God, our reason is a fragment of divine universal reason, our own separate portion. Likewise, our souls are fragments of the world soul of God. The relationship between our reason and soul is like the relationship of a child to their parent; a child Is born of their parents but is separate and autonomous from them. This relationship to God is also something we should take pride in, in the same way a fool might have taken pride in being adopted by Caesar in Epictetus’ time.
Two components are intermingled in us at birth—the body, which we have in common with animals, and reason and intelligence, which we have in common with gods—and while most of us gravitate toward a relationship with the body, a wretched and lifeless thing, few incline toward the divine and blessed component.
-Discourses 1.3.3 (Waterfield)
Here Epictetus is bringing in a dichotomy between the body and reason, again this is a rhetorical exaggeration, as noted by Robin Waterfield in his note on this section, the point Epictetus wants to make clear is it is our soul that we should be concerned with not our body. This is important as one of the primary ways we go wrong is in assuming things that are pleasant are good. This is a natural development and due to the persuasiveness of impressions[2]. We are all oriented towards an affinity for ourselves and seek things that benefit our own self-preservation. When we don’t examine things properly though we confuse the pleasure with the actual healthful nourishment that is appropriate to prefer, we do things like eat because the food is tasty and not because we need the energy to live and thrive.
Virtue is that state of the soul which tends to make the whole of one’s life harmonious; and if a rational animal goes the wrong way, it is because it allows itself to be misled by the deceitful appearances [persuasive impressions] of external things, or perhaps by the instigation of those whose company it keeps; for nature herself never gives us any but good inclinations.
-Diogenes Laertius 7.89[3]
This confusion leads to our valuing indifferents relating to the body as if they were good which isn’t true. This is something that happens from nature, so it is in a way a natural belief, but not a true belief, which is going to lead to our inevitable suffering if we do not work to rectify the issue.
This kinship with the body is the reason why some of us, having gravitated in that direction, become like wolves—deceptive, cunning, and pernicious—and others like lions—fierce, brutal, and wild—while most of us are foxes and other forms of wretched animal life. I mean, isn’t ‘fox’ the perfect description of a scurrilous and malicious person—unless he’s some lower and more wretched creature? So be careful, and make sure that you don’t turn out to be one of these wretched creatures.
-Discourses 1.3.7-9
Epictetus wants to stop valuing goods of the body, which aren’t real goods, and avoid becoming wretched creatures. In order to do this, we need to keep in mind our relationship to God, and properly utilize our reason and intelligence, these are gifts we should be grateful for and proud of having. It is in understanding this higher purpose that we can become virtuous, full of self-respect and avoid being disgraceful. And to end it off, a small section of Cleanthes Hymn to Zeus touching on the same topic.
It is shirked and avoided by all the wicked among mortals,
The wretched, who ever long for the getting of good things,
Neither see nor hear God’s universal law,
By which, obeying with understanding, they could share in the good life.
But instead they chase after this and that, far from the good,
Some in their aggressive zeal for fame,
Others with a disordered obsession with profits,
Still others in indulgence and the pleasurable exertions of the body.
[They desire the good] but are carried off here and there,
All the while in zealous pursuit of completely different outcomes.
-Cleanthes Hymn to Zeus (22-31)[4]
A free version of the Discourse can be read here https://en.m.wikisource.org/wiki/Epictetus,_the_Discourses_as_reported_by_Arrian,_the_Manual,_and_Fragments/Book_1/Chapter_
[1] Robin Waterfield – Epictetus The Complete Works
[2] Margaret Graver – Stoicism and Emotion, Chapter 7
[3] CD Yonge & Keith Seddon – A Summary of Stoic Philosophy: Zeno of Citium in Diogenes Laertius Book Seven
[4] Stephen Hanselman – Cleanthes Hymn to Zeus https://dailystoic.com/cleanthespoem/